Due to their self-reflex iv e propensity , postmodern fiction and metafiction, in particular, hav e been relentlessly criticized of solipsism and of an indifference to relate to the ex tralinguistic world. While the nov el is deemed to pause in its trajectory to ex amine itself, to ex amine its conv entions and rejections of them, to address its future uncertainties and its at-present struggles, it has become a misprision that all it can bestow to its readers is an understanding of itself. The basic argument unrav els as follows: language is dev oid of reality , therefore, literature does not contain reality either; now more than ev er, fiction recognizes that it is a self-contained artifact which can only engage in a representation of itself, hav ing no interest in proffering its readers any thing but an understanding of itself. The nov el in the postmodern period has faced the crisis of representation, when linguists and theorists alike unmask the insufficiency of language and its inability to represent reality . Under the scrutiny of language, metafiction emerges; a fiction which is more than ev er aware of the inadequacies of its medium, and which is conscious of its subsequent inability to represent the world; hence the conclusions that all its pronouncements can only be about itself. This v iew delimits the possibilities of (meta)fiction, whose nature is apparently more intricate: while recognizing the distance between itself and reality , while shifting the emphasis from reality to itself, literature can nev er only be about itself; ev en if it attempts to repudiate the world, the world will forev er be part of what makes literature possible.
about itself. Self-consciousness, self-awareness, self-reflection, self-containment, self-absorption, self-indulgence, self-disclosure, self-commenting, self-lov e, self-obsession connote metafiction, and hav e been repetitiv ely used in relation with the term throughout the forty y ears since its inception.
[2] The prefix "meta" denotes that this fiction refers to none other than back to itself, imitating the composition of similar compounds, such as the linguistic usage of metalanguage, which means the (technical) language employ ed to describe (human) language(s); or Frederic Jameson's metacommentary , which is the language of interpretation about interpretation and criticism; or Leonel Abel's metatheater, etc. Metaization, as ex plained by Werner Wolf deliv ers a secondary , hierarchically superior lev el of self-reflection from the first cognitiv e or communicativ e lev el, be it thought or language (2). Within this purv iew, metafiction remains attached to language and interpretation. But if we were to understand the term based on the ety mological morpheme it carries, the Greek prefix "meta" does not mean "about something" but "bey ond something." [3] Aristotle's metaphy sics does not refer to phy sics about phy sics, but what lies beyond the terrain of phy sics. Metafiction is undoubtedly fiction about fiction, but it is also fiction bey ond fiction and hence the way s we hav e looked at metafictional nov els hitherto may need some modification in order to incorporate its transcendental aspect; for, what lies bey ond the limits of a self-contained tex t with its own univ erse and reality is none other than the reader's reality . [4] The profound emphasis on the introv ersion of literature portray s metafiction as the moment of self-knowledge for the nov el. Roland Barthes notes that up to this point " [literature] spoke but did not speak itself" ("Literature and Metalanguage" 97 ). Patricia Waugh argues that with metafiction the nov el recognizes the need to theorize about itself: "Only in this way might the genre establish an identity and v alidity within a culture apparently hostile to its printed, linear narrativ e and conv entional assumptions about 'plot,' 'character,' 'authority 'and 'representation'. The traditional fictional quest has thus been transformed into a quest for fictionality " (1 0). This inward turn is often interpreted as literature's aspiration to shake off the burden of carry ing a representation of the outside world and thus reach its "defeat and death, or v ictory and freedom" (Barth, "Literature of Ex haustion" 1 7 1 ). Since most critics agree that the nov el with metafiction is not headed towards its decline, the underly ing assumption is that it is seeking v ictory , freedom and reality 's emancipation. [5] In a poetic metaphor regarding literature and reality , Roland Barthes compares their conv oluted relation to that of Orpheus and Eury dice:
One could say that literature is Orpheus returning from the underworld; as long as literature walks ahead, aware that it is leading someone, the reality behind it which it is gradually leading out of the unnamed -that reality breathes, walks, liv es, heads toward the light of a meaning; but once literature turns around to look at what it lov es, all that is left is a named meaning, which is a dead meaning. ("Literature and Signification" 268) Barthes's elaborate analogy can better be illuminated if one has the realist nov el and the metafictional nov el in mind. In the realist nov el, according to Barthes's proposition, literature leads the way to reality ; it is as if literature is assured of reality 's possession; it is as if reality belongs to literature indisputably . Howev er, the v ery moment literature turns to gaze at its obedient follower -which is what metafiction attempts by turning back at itself, at what it is made of -reality dissipates. It is at this crucial moment, according to Barthes, that fiction realizes it cannot and does not contain reality ; only by being obliv ious of itself, can literature cherish the belief that reality follows it at all times.
This Barthean ax iom, along with Derrida's "there is nothing outside of the tex t," or there is no transcendental signified (1 58, 20) , and de Man's "fiction [...] asserts itself as pure nothingness" (1 9) , hav e been adopted as the normativ e v iews in postmodern theory , [6] generating positiv e reactions which promulgate the position that literature may giv e its readers nothing but a picture of literature.
If illusionistic fiction, in conjuring up a world, can teach us things about the real world, about people, their emotions and manners, anti-illusionistic fiction [7 ] too teaches us things: that the only life that counts is our life and not, say Tom Jones'; that Tom Jones or, for that matter, Lord Jim can teach us pretty little to help us come to grips with our ex istence; that a nov el, like any other work of the imagination, is not reality ; that it is no more than a man-made object, an artifact, whose rules, normally kept secret by a writer, we hav e a chance to learn through anti-illusionistic fiction; and because we know these rules, we can liberate ourselv es, ev en if the process may be painful, from the deceptiv e influence of the illusionistic nov el. We obtain thereby an idea of art and its function totally different from the notion we held when equating art with reality ; we come to appreciate art as a fabrication, capable of inducing in us, first and foremost, an aesthetic ex perience, and not as one designed primarily to help us, by a distribution of associated wisdom, get along in life. (Imhof 25) The classical didactic quality of literature as presented by Horace and Longinus is transformed by Rudiger Imhof to another form of didacticism: that of teaching about the impossibility of teaching about life, and that of teaching about literature. Imhof decrees that with metafiction life ex periences are set aside; not ev en v icariously can readers learn from a protagonist's predicaments and (mis)adv entures, because literature can only discuss and project itself. Not many readers would plunge into a nov el in order to discov er possible way s to solv e their problems, nor would they consider literature a "user's manual" (to ev oke George Perec's ironic title) for learning how to lead their liv es. Nonetheless, ev en in the most absurd and incongruous fiction the reader projects an image, equally absurd perhaps and highly subjectiv e, of himself and of the world. Ev ery aspect that Imhof names as being ex posed in metafictional nov els (that it is a work of the imagination, an artifact, a man-made object) lie dormant in the back of the reader's mind ev er since she read the word "nov el" on the cov er of the book, any book, metafictional or otherwise. One would agree with Imhof when he asserts that "metafiction all but assists us in our escapist desires" (25). Instead of letting the reader forget the phrase "a nov el" on the cov er page, it thwarts her attempts to immerse herself inside the fiction of another world by mainly keeping her on the surface, alway s alert, alway s flashing before her in numerous way s: this is a nov el. Punctuating its fictiv eness and constantly interpolating the reader's illusion of disbelief is, howev er, inconclusiv e ev idence that metafiction does not contain inside itself a form of the empirical reality with which the reader can identify or v iew as familiar. As Marcel Cornis-Pope writes: "To interpret [metafictional tex ts] as narrowly self-referential is to miss the ideological impact that a self-critical focus on articulation can hav e;" it questions "our perceptual and discursiv e sy stems, reinv enting the rules by which reality is projected" (262, 259).
Reality will alway s be part of the reader's (and author's) schemata -that is, the univ ersal knowledge they carry to the act of reading (and writing) -nev er allowing fiction to break free. Barthes and Imhof nev er deny that the reader brings to the tex t something of his own; but while they argue that the reader reconstructs and recreates the tex t anew through the act of reading and mentally interpreting, the reality that she accesses is not the same as the one fabricated by the author, neither is it the same as the reader's empirical reality . It is a reality alway s fabricated and re-fabricated with ev ery reading. It is a reality alway s fabricated and re-fabricated with ev ery reading. But, how ever many and how ever dissimilar these realities are, they are grounded upon empirical reality. For Linda Hutcheon, the tex t initially depends upon the reader's knowledge of reality , but the more the reader flips the pages, the deeper she descends to a world which is little by little separating itself from the outside and arriv es at a point of self-sustainment (Narcissistic Narrative 92). The irony , howev er, is that the selfsustaining world of literature is unremittingly fed by empirical reality . It is a v icious circle one cannot escape.
" [The] nov el is, in fact, related to life ex periences in a v ery real way for the reader: that is, the nov el is a continuation of that ordering, decoding, naming, fiction-making process that is part of the reader's normal coming-to-terms with ex perience in the real world" ("Metafictional Implications" [5] [6] . If the reader, who is acknowledged as the co-author of the tex t, is constantly and incessantly clashing the two worlds in her attempt to construct the tex t, is it not implicit that her empirical world, or at the v ery least, a form of the empirical world would inescapably find its way into the fiction? Due to the fact that reality 's ex istence in literature is so rudimentary (unless, for ex ample, we know what a lighthouse is, we will nev er be able to imagine its penetrating light into Mrs. Ramsey 's dining room, ev en though we cannot touch or feel the lighthouse in the tex t), it almost allows one to perceiv e their relationship as imperceptible.
Literature draws from the elements of our empirical reality -a reality which is undoubtedly chaotic, amorphous and incomprehensible -in order to conjure its own v ersion of another reality , fully dependent upon the first one, no matter how different. Ev en the most remotely realistic nov els encompass a form of reality -that of 'non reality ' -because in order for the reader to apprehend the contex t of the fictiv e reality , she needs to know, howev er imperfectly , the reality we all share. It would not be improbable to argue that the prison-house of language is in fact the prison-house of the most basic and fundamental forms of reality . On the one hand, the most imaginativ e and improbable unrealities ineluctably imbibe the empirical world and, on the other hand, "ex istence is just as much an image in the mind's ey e as in the beholder's" (Whiteside 1 7 9).
Possible world theory has tried to account for the reality contained in fiction by creating another intermediary univ erse, where ev ery literary referent points to an equiv alent secondary , fictiv e referent. This secondary referent subordinates the primary , "real" referent thereby not only delineating their interdependence, but also prev enting the literary sign from turning back at itself, nullify ing the claim "literature can only be about itself" -"The name Hamlet is neither empty nor self-referential; it refers to an indiv idual of a fictional world" (Dolezel 1 6) .
In an illuminating article regarding the fictiv e referent of the metafictional nov el, Linda Hutcheon identifies four lev els of reference, only one of which points inside the tex t. The outer mimetic lev el of reference is the linkage to Metafiction teaches us that the aim of realist fiction for instance is wrongheaded and that our old reaction is inadequate... the world outside the nov el in the sense of the "inev itable and presupposed knowledge" necessary to the creation of the fictional world ("Metafictional Implications" 9). It is this lev el which is mainly neglected and allows scholars like Imhof to reach the conclusion that metafiction can only denote its fictionality .
The chain of argumentation mov es from the awry concept of ontology to the equally awry concept of epistemology : can the reader ex tract something from fiction? If, according to Imhof, when reading metafiction, one learns the tricks of the trade, what is the reason for reading such nov els? In order to become metafictional nov elists? Imhof recognizes the imperativ e need to address the issue:
The profit one gains from knowing how fiction works is like the profit one gains from discov ering how, say , a belov ed toy operates. One's concept of art and literature is corrected and enlarged. But it is not only fiction's workings, whose secrets are rev ealed; what is also, and probably more importantly , at stake is the response to fiction. Metafiction teaches us that the aim of realist fiction for instance is wrongheaded and that our old reaction is inadequate... Since [metafictionists] are aware of the inability of man to tell the truth about the world, because any such statement to this effect is bound to be subjectiv e, they do not consider it worth their efforts to try and do so in the first place. Instead they tell purely fictional stories, and, in the attempt to withhold nothing and tell it all, they ev en show how they go about their business. (26) Does Imhof imply that metafiction is headed the right way , in opposition to realist fiction which is wrong? Is metafiction deemed superior because it escapes the "lie" of all other ty pes of fiction by acknowledging it may only be self-referential?
Although in the ev olutionary road of literature certain periods demonstrate a reaction to prev ious ones, its ov erall progression is not one of comparison-of-parts, but one of dev elopmental transformation. In the ex cerpt, Imhof ov ertly maintains that in metafiction one can only discov er the whereabouts of fiction and should seek nothing further; howev er, would this impertinent remark not point to a loss? As Brian Stonehill affirms, the reader loses something essential, which probably drew her towards fiction in the first place, when nov elists sacrifice too much of the traditional narrativ e v alues: "The most engaging and rewarding self-conscious fictions [...] manage to combine a story that we care about with reminders that it is a story ; and the best of these will be those in which the appeal of the art and the reminders of artifice are both dev eloped to their fullest possible ex tent" (1 6). With metafiction, literature self-reflex iv ely problematizes its relation with both language and the world and recognizes that, no matter how hard it tries, it will alway s carry a form of language and an objectified, processed and perhaps constructed form of the empirical world; moreov er, under no circumstances does it neglect to giv e something more than a panoramic self-portrait.
Calv ino's If on a Winter's Night a Traveler
, and Michalopoulou's Wishbone Memories will serv e as audible ex amples that manipulate the interplay between what reality offers to fiction and how self-reflex iv e, introv erted fiction bestows something to the world that engendered it. If on a Winter's Night a Traveler is the story of the reader, a fictiv e reader none other than the character you, who bought a malfunctioning nov el responsible for plummeting him into a consequential series of numerous adv enturous readings. Calv ino's witty and play ful narration has his character-reader jump from nov el to nov el in his effort to continue reading the first story he began entitled "If on a Winter Night's a Trav eler" by Italo Calv ino. Once the protagonist recognizes that, due to a publication error, the contex t of the book he thought he was reading was not from Calv ino's book, he sets off on a journey : on a literary lev el, he is doomed to read only the beginnings of ten nov els of v arious genres, most of which end at the moment of climax , while on a fictiv e-empirical lev el he is determined to discov er who is responsible for the mix up of the books. From his ex plorations he gains a girlfriend and co-reader called Ludmilla, some knowledge about the act of reading and critiquing nov els, and the ex perience of trav elling to a my thic country where he was held prisoner.
The final chapter allows for the entire nov el to be interpreted as a Homeric metaphor pertaining to the act of reading fiction. The nov el's final lines are:
Now y ou are man and wife, Reader and Reader. A great double bed receiv es y our parallel readings.
Ludmilla closes her book, turns off her light, puts her head back against the pillow, and say s, "Turn off y our light, too. Aren't y ou tired of reading?" And y ou say , "Just a moment, I'v e almost finished If on a Winter's Night a Traveler by Italo Calv ino." (260) The "y ou" in this passage cannot be entirely conflated with the reader "y ou" who held the wrong book in his hands.
This "y ou" is finishing the right nov el. In terms of framing, Calv ino presents at least three lev els of fictiv eness: a) the fiction of the v arious interrupted nov els; b) the fiction of the reader who reads the discontinued beginnings;
Identify ing the three lev els is almost ax iomatic, but where is their defining line situated? Ludmilla belongs to the contex t of the fictiv e reader (not the implied) because he meets her when he returns the book at the bookstore and is informed that his copy is defectiv e, as is hers. Ludmilla and the fictiv e reader are nev er ex posed to the story Calv ino wrote, but to Silas Flannery 's fiction and to the prank orchestrated by Ermes Manara. An ensuing paradox dangles before us, the fourth-lev el readers: how can Ludmilla participate in two realities? What was Calv ino's intention in giv ing her this metaleptic quality , [8] in raising her from the second degree of fictiv eness to the third? Ludmilla is nothing but a metaphor in Calv ino's nov el. She substantiates the "something," the "je ne sais quoi" that any real reader unplants from the fiction she is engaged in and imports into her reality -the impliedreader-protagonist brought her with him from his reading of If on a Winter's Night a Traveler. Ev ery reader gains something from the act of nov elistic reading, thereby smashing the boundaries between fiction and reality , since the v ery medium of the book she positions in her hands, despite its ungraspability , shares part of itself with the world outside. In Michalopoulou's Wishbone Memories, the influential attribute of fiction is manifested in the trajectory of the protagonist, Athena, who, like the Calv inian character, is also a reader, contributing to the fiction she reads (and translates), while simultaneously obtaining some kind of self-knowledge in rev erse. A translator of foreign tex ts for a Greek newspaper, Athena is asked to translate her brother's, Elias, nov ella from English to Greek. Unable to find a publisher, mainly because of the brev ity of his work, Athena decides to ex pand his collection of short stories by inserting her own narration, a form of diary about her personal life, which coincides with the timeline of her translating the book. The result is two stories unrav eling simultaneously ; two distinct v oices, one coming from fiction and the other coming from the fiction of the fiction.
Elias deploy s magic realism to tell the stories of his family which are narrated by food; a meatball or a soup, as objectiv e observ ers, document instances of his family 's life. But Elias both recreates and inv ents his family .
Initially , Athena reports ev ery div ersification he makes accusing him of falsehood: "The entire content of the Parsley Salad is nothing but a lie. There is no Alex andra in our family . Uncle Foti is still aliv e. Aunt Isabel only makes French dishes with béchamel" (89).
[9] But gradually she cherishes Elias' putativ e lies more than the real facts she knows. Not only does she come to admit that his alterations are meaningful in way s she was prev iously blindfolded, but she also ex periences herself slowly sipping into his nov el, losing her grav ity and being absorbed into the pages she translates. She consciously changes her relationship with ev ery member of her family , seeing each one of them from a new perspectiv e, helping herself to understand them and learn more about herself through them. She quits her job as a translator at a newspaper, hav ing discov ered her true lov e for food, a trade that alway s ran in the family but, to her, unmasked itself for the first time in her brother's fiction. Her life changes in the true fashion Elias predicts at the end of his nov ella: "Books are the most dangerous things in the world. They can put in y our head a thousand foolish ideas. And then, ev ery one blames alcohol. No. Twenty bottles of brandy are harmless compared to satanic books" (41 4). In this way , Wishbone Memories reconciles the two opposing worlds, fiction and reality , by requiring that the reader v iew life as a nov el and the nov el as life, for, their relation is bidirectional and their influence mutual.
Towards the end of the nov el, when Athena becomes a great cook and dev elops a masterful recipe that lures, she asks the reader to imagine its taste: "Close y our ey es. Great. Now chew a wonderful bite from this sweet and sour tentacle. It is soft and warm, despite the fact it remained for day s at room temperature..." (363). When she giv es an alternativ e solution for hav ing her readers taste her masterpiece, Athena say s: "Another way would be to make a few pounds of this octopus, to cut it in slices and offer it along with the nov el. Just imagine what would happen if the nov el was distributed along with a tentacle of Octapus ax-ax-xra [the name of the recipe] instead of a bookmark!" (363). Into this play ful atmosphere, full of humor that attempts to defy the nov el's own artificiality , Wishbone Memories inv ites the reader to celebrate this artificiality of fiction, by stretching a hand and deliv ering a piece of itself to the outside, the true, real world. If Athena became a new Athena after reading her brother's fiction, how will the book Wishbone Memories affect its audience? Like Ludmilla, Athena's recipe is the "je ne sais quoi" each reader acquires ev en after she closes the book shut.
It suffices to say that pronouncements which regard (meta)fiction as uninterested in or dev oid of the real world, consequently v iewing (meta)fiction as proffering nothing to its readers, are puerile efforts to minimize fiction's significance. It would be ex haustiv e for literature to escape reality , like a turtle wanting to flee its shell, and concomitantly it would be unprecedented if the reader finished a book without gaining something, like a v oy ager who trav els abroad but returns none the wiser. Unlike other ty pes of fiction, metafiction is cognizant that the reality it contains is not identical to that of the real world -replicas are after all only mere replicas -but it nev er
